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Monday, April 29, 2013

Agriculture Land Grab..

Farming was considered as a commodity business with very poor margins.. 
During the industrial revolution value addition.. Industrialization.. consumerism and then Services were the "goto" growth areas..

But what we are seeing is a sharp increase in interest in Farming by corporate's and people in the know.
here is an interesting article about how farmlands are being accumulated left right and center and Africa is the epicenter..

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WHO’S BEHIND THE LAND GRABS?

A look at some of the people pursuing or supporting large farmland grabs around the world 
(October 2012)

Every day there are new stories of companies buying up farm-lands. Malaysian palm oil giants buying up lands for plantations in West Africa. Wall Street bankers taking over cattle ranches in Brazil. Saudi businessmen signing land deals in the Philippines. The latest dataset on land grabs claims that 10 million hectares of land have been grabbed by foreign companies on average every year since 2007.

The result is that a small number of people are taking over more and more of the world’s farmlands, and the water that goes with it, leaving everyone else with less, or none at all. As the world plunges deeper into a food crisis, these new farmland lords will hold sway over who gets to eat and who doesn’t and who profits and who perishes within the food system.

The global farmland grab is only happening because people are pursuing it. The number of land grabbers is small, in contrast with the high number of people displaced by their actions. They are mostly men, often with experience working with agribusi-ness companies or banks. Some of them sit at high–levels of government and intergovernmental agencies, and sometimes at the highest levels. They operate out of the big Financial centres of the world and often get together at farmland investor meet-ings, whether in Singapore, Zanzibar or New York City. 
We think it might help the debate over land grabs to pull back the curtain a little on who these people are. So we’ve pieced together a slide show that tells about some of those who have been actively pursuing or supporting farmland grabs. It’s an emblematic set of land grabbers, not a comprehensive one. 

Knowing who’s invovled can also help us in pressuring the land grabbers to stop. Each landgrabber profile indicates who his or her friends are and provides resources for those who want further information or to pursue actions.


Profiles of some of the people pursuing or supporting large farmland grabs around the world:

  Jean–Claude Gandur, Addax (Switzerland) 
  Jose Minaya, TIAA-CREF (US) 
  Sai Ramakrishna Karuturi, Karuturi Global (India)
  Calvin Burgess, Dominion Farms (US) 
  C “Siva” Sivasankaran, Siva Group (India) 
  Neil Crowder, Chayton Capital (UK) 
  Michael Barton, Farm Lands of Africa (UK) 
  Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia) 
  Eduardo Elsztain, Cresud (Argentina) 
  Susan Payne, Emergent Asset Management (Canada) 
  Dr. Hatim Mukhtar, Foras International (Saudi Arabia) 
  Theo De Jager, AgriSA (South Africa) 
  The World Bank Group 
  Antonio L. Tiu, Agrinurture (Philippines) 
  Hou Weigui, ZTE (China)


Jean-Claude Gandur (Switzerland)
Owner of Addax Bioenergy

In April 2012, farmers in Sierra Leone gathered for an assembly of communities affected by large-scale foreign land investments. Many participants came to speak about a 10,000-ha sugarcane project operated by AddaX bIOENERGY, an ethanol company owned by Swiss billionaire Jean-Claude Gandur. "We've been evicted from our farmland without compensation" said Zainab Sesay, a woman farmer from the project area. “Now I don’t have a farm. Starvation is killing people. We have to buy rice to survive because we don’t grow our own now,” said Zainab Kamara, another farmer displaced by the Addax project. 

In his Geneva headquarters, surrounded by his impressive collection of art and antiquities, Gandur tells a different story. He explains to reporters that his project complies with the social and environmental standards set by the African Development Bank, the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation and the European Union. Indeed, over half of the company’s project costs are met by development banks. “That’s why I don’t feel guilty of doing anything immoral,” says Gandur.   

Gandur built his fortune, estimated at US$2 billion, trading commodities and buying up oil concessions in Nigeria and other African countries. In 2009, he sold his interests in the oil business and turned his attention to the continent’s farmlands. Fuel is still his focus, but now it’s ethanol, not petroleum.  For his first big project, Gandur selected Sierra Leone, a war–ravaged country where mal-nutrition affects one third of the population. It’s a controversial spot to grow sugar cane for the pro-duction of ethanol for export. Not only has the company’s takeover of 10,000 ha of “fertile and well–watered” land and forest displaced local food production, it’s also taking away access to water for farmers living downstream. The company’s sugar–cane plantation will use 26% of Sierra Leone’s largest river ow during the driest months, February to April.  

Gandur says that his ethanol project, due to become fully operational in 2013, is “a good way to bring back agriculture in Africa.” But good for whom? The Swiss group Brot für Alle carried out a basic analysis of the company’s numbers and found that Addax would take home an annual return of US$53 million, about 98% of the value added by the project. The company’s 2,000 or so low–paid workers would get only 2% of the value, while the landowners who leased their land to the company would receive a mere 0.2% of the value added. All told, says Brot für Alle, the project will provide less than US$1 per month to each person effected by the project. 

Friends of Gandur: 

Swedish Development Fund (Swedfund): In December 2011, Addax Bionergy announced that Swedfund had become a major shareholder of its mother company, the Addax & Oryx Group.

Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO): Along with the African Development Bank and several other development banks, FMO provides debt financing to Addax Bioenergy and is a major shareholder in its mother company, the Addax & Oryx Group.

Going Further:
Action for Large–scale Land Acquisition Transparency (ALLAT), a network of civil society organisations and landowner and user associations in Sierra Leone, created to monitor land investments throughout the country and to sensitize communities (allat@greenscenery.org)




Jose Minaya (USA)
Managing Director of the Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association – College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF)

Slave labour, theft of indigenous lands, destruction of forests and savannas – these are some of the hallmarks of Brazil's sugar-cane industry. Now, thanks in part to an influx of foreign cash, the industry is booming as never before. Over the past ten years, the area devoted to sugar cane in Brazil has nearly doubled, from 4.8 to 8.1 million ha, with at least 1,000 ha of land converted to sugar-cane plantations every day. Most of this expansion is happening in the country's , a biodiverse savanna that is home to around 160,000 plant and animal species, many of them endangered. Brazilian workers are paying the price too: the industry is one of the most dangerous, exploitative and poorly paid sectors in which to work. And, as sugar cane expands, land is taken out of food production into the hands of Brazil's sugar barons, in a country where 3% of the population already holds almost two-thirds of the country's arable land.

Teachers and professors in the US may not know it, but their retirement savings are being used to profit from this expansion of sugar-cane plantations in Brazil. Under the helm of its Managing Director, Jose Minaya, New York-based TIAA–CREF, the biggest fund manager of retirement schemes for US teachers and professors, has channelled hundreds of millions of dollars into a fund that acquires Brazilian farmland and converts it into sugar-cane plantations.

The fund is called Radar Propriedades Agrícolas. It was launched by Brazil's largest sugar-cane producer, Cosan, to identify properties in Brazil that it could acquire cheaply, convert mainly into sugar-cane plantations, and then sell at a profit within a few years. Cosan, which owns 19% of the fund, manages the fund's investments and retains first rights to acquire lands before Radar puts them on the market. The other 81% of the fund is owned by TIAA–CREF through its Brazilian holding company, Mansilla. At the end of 2010, Radar had spent US$440 million to acquire more than 180 farms in Brazil, covering 84,000 ha, with plans to spend another US$800 million in the near future to acquire 60 more farms, covering 340,000 ha.

TIAA–CREF's farmland portfolio extends well beyond Brazil. Since 2007, the company has spent US$2.5 billion taking over farms around the world, turning hundreds of thousands of hectares in Australia, Poland, Romania and the US into corporate farms through its subsidiary the Westchester Group.

TIAA–CREF's motto, however, is "Financial Services for the Greater Good" and, in 2011, it joined seven European institutional investors to launch the Farmland Principles, a set of five principles committing signatories not to engage in farmland deals that harm the environment or violate labour or human rights, or land and resource rights. Experience suggests that TIAA–CREF can be pressured to divest from the global farmland grab. It has already pulled out of investments in companies operating in Darfur, and is now the target of a nationwide campaign to get it to divest from companies that profit from the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.

Friends of Minaya:

AP2: The Swedish National Pension Fund's second vehicle, AP2, sunk €177 million (US$240.7 million) into TIAA–CREF's Westchester Group in 2011 for the acquistion of farmland.

Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec: In May 2012, Canada's second-largest pension fund manager announced a C$250-million investment in a global farmland fund managed by TIAA–CREF, in which AP2 and the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (bcIMC) also participating.

Royal Dutch Shell: In 2010 it set up a US$12-billion, 50:50 ethanol joint venture with Cosan that Radar says will increase its opportunities for farmland investments.

Going further:
Carlos Vinicius Xavier, Fábio T. Pitta and Maria Luisa Mendonça, "A monopoly in Ethanol production in Brazil: The Cosan–Shell merger", Milieudefensi and TNI, 2011.



Sai Ramakrishna Karuturi (India)
CEO and Founder of Karuturi Global Ltd

When people talk of land grabs in Africa, a name that crops up often is "Karuturi". Sai Ramakrishna Karuturi, India's "King of Roses", made his fortune farming roses in East Africa for European markets. Now he's ploughing those profits into his next big African project: food production.

Karuturi has huge ambitions. He wants to set up farming operations on more than 1 million ha, mainly in eastern and southern Africa, to produce maize, rice, sugar cane and palm oil. "In 5–10 years time I would like to be seen and compared with peers such as Cargill or ADM or the Bunges of the world," he says. He's already taken control of 311,700 ha in Ethiopia, and is negotiating for another 370,000 ha in Tanzania. Plans are also in train for a farm project in the Republic of Congo, and fruit and vegetable farms in Sudan, Mozambique and Ghana.

Karuturi calls Africa's farmlands "green gold". It's easy to see why. For every hectare he puts under rice production on his farm in Gambela, Ethiopia, he expects US$660 in profit per year. His company will have to pay only US$46 per hectare per year for the land, labour and water it uses.

But Karuturi’s skill as a farmer is questionable. His first maize harvest in Gambela was destroyed by a flood that overwhelmed his canal system, causing US$15 million-worth of damage and requiring a further US$15 million for reinforcement. Unable to bring all the lands he's leased into production on time, he has tried to sub-let chunks to Indian farmers on a revenue-sharing basis. This has caused problems with the Ethiopian government. When several hundred Indians arrived at Addis Ababa airport at the end of 2011, ostensibly as machine operators for the Karuturi farm, the Ethiopian Government turned them away.

Karuturi's operations are also deeply entangled in land conflicts, especially in Gambela. According to a 2012 report by Human Rights Watch, the Ethiopian Government is forcibly relocating 70,000 indigenous people in western Gambela to new villages that lack adequate food, farmland, healthcare, or educational facilities, in order to make way for large-scale agricultural projects of foreign investors, including Karuturi. The report said that crops belonging to local Anuak communities were cleared without consent to make way for the Karuturi operations, and that residents of Ilea, a village of over 1,000 people within Karuturi's lease area, were told by the Ethiopian government that they would be moved in 2012 as part of its "villagisation programme". Karuturi, however, denies any connection between his company's activities and the government's villagisation programme. He says the report is "hogwash" and "a completely jaundiced western vision". He even denies that the villagisation programme exists.

Friends of Karuturi:

Djibouti: Signed a contract for Karuturi to supply it with 40,000 tonnes of food per year at international market prices.

Government of India: Funds Karuturi through the Exim Bank and Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited.

John Deer Co.: Supplies Karuturi with tractors for its operations.

World Bank: Karuturi is in final negotiations with its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency for political risk insurance.

Going further:

Anywaa Survival Organisation, a UK-based group supporting the Anywaa people of Gambela, Ethiopia

Calvin Burgess (US)
CEO, Dominion Farms

Calvin Burgess moved to the US from Canada in 1976 and immediately got into the construction business. He soon built up a small empire, involved in everything from real estate to prisons, Mexican sock factories to pig farms. But in his late 50s Burgess felt it was time to do something "significant" instead of just "living a good life and dying a rich guy". So, inspired by the stories of a woman at his church who had spent time in Kenya, he decided that he would go there too and see how he could make a difference. "God has plans for people's lives," says Burgess, "and I thought that maybe this was part of His plan for me."

Burgess set up shop in western Kenya, in a place called the Yala Swamp. His idea: to build Africa's largest rice farm – Dominion Farms – on 7,000 ha of land he acquired under a 25-year renewable lease agreement. But there was one problem. Thousands of people live, farm and raise livestock on the same land and depend on the same water source. Dominion Farms occupies 40% of the Yala Swamp, but the dam that the company built to irrigate its rice fields has flooded a much larger area and made it practically impossible for the local communities to raise livestock. Local residents also say that Burgess's project destroyed their access to potable water, and that the regular aerial spraying of fertilisers and agrochemicals makes them and their animals sick.

For all this, they have seen little in return – a few hundred poorly paid jobs, and compensation packages of about US$60 per home for those who left. No wonder the locals are upset and demanding that Burgess and his company pack up and leave. In August 2011, Burgess filed a report with the police claiming that protestors had made threats on his life. "When you try to help these people all they do is complain," says Burgess.

Undaunted by the opposition in Kenya, Burgess is now expanding into Nigeria, where he has acquired 30,000 ha in Taraba State, with the backing of former President Olusegun Obasanjo. In 2009, Burgess also announced that he had found investors to replicate his Kenyan farm model in Liberia on 17,000 ha.

Friends of Burgess:

Olusegun Obasanjo: The former President of Nigeria calls Burgess "a friend of Nigeria", and has been intimately involved in helping Burgess to secure land in the country.

Going further:

Kick Dominion Farms out of Yala campaign: facebook ; online petition
Good Fortune (film)



C"Siva" Sivasankaran (India)
CEO, Siva Group

C. Sivasankaran is one of India's richest men, with a net worth of more than US$4 billion. He made most of his fortune pioneering sales of discounted PCs, mobile phone networks and broadband internet services in India. Sivasankaran keeps a low public profile and rarely gives public interviews. He is said to hold a "big bang approach to life" and is known to travel the world using his large fleet of private planes and yachts, staying in the most expensive presidential suites.

Lately, Sivasankaran has developed an interest in farmland. He started by taking major stakes in several Indian companies that have been acquiring farmland overseas: a 12% stake in Ruchi Soya, which has 50,000 ha on long-term lease in Ethiopia; a 10% stake in KS Oils, which has 56,000 ha for palm oil in Indonesia; and a 3% stake in Karuturi Global, which has a 300,000-ha land lease in Ethiopia.

Palm oil appears to be Sivasankaran's favourite commodity. In 2010, he bought a minority stake in Feronia, a Canada-based company that acquired 100,000 ha for palm-oil and soybean production in the DR Congo, and then set up a joint venture with London's Equatorial Palm Oil, taking 50% control of the company's 170,000 ha in Liberia. Sivasankaran is now moving more directly into the field. He set up Biopalm Energy, a subsidiary of his Singapore-based Siva Group, and quickly snatched up 200,000 ha in Cameroon and 80,000 ha in Sierra Leone to produce palm oil for export to India, where it will be refined and sold.

"I’m a community land user, I live from farming," says one woman from the Pujehun district of Sierra Leone, where Siva has taken land. "But now the investors, this Biopalm company [SIVA Group], has come and the Paramount Chief gives all the land away, even the land I use for farming, for collecting firewood, for native herbs [medicines], for everything. Now it’s all gone. I have nothing."

All told, Siva has his hands on 756,000 ha of farmland, 670,000 ha of it in Africa.

Friends of Siva:

Singapore - provides a tax and financial haven for the registration of the Siva Group.

Going further:

Action for Large-Scale Land Acquisition Transparency (ALLAT), a network of civil society organisations and landowner and user associations in Sierrra Leone created to monitor land investments throughout the country and to sensitise communities (allat@greenscenery.org).


Neil Crowder (UK)
CEO, Chayton Capital

Neil Crowder, who describes himself as "a well-educated US citizen who four years ago would not have been able to locate Zambia on a map", left Goldman Sachs to co-found Chayton Capital, a private equity fund which is spending US$300 million in agribusiness ventures in six African countries. The test case is Zambia, where it acquired a 14-year lease on 20,000 ha in Mkushi. It intends to aggregate its lands into a single operation, called "Chobe Agrivision", within a 50-kilometre radius.

Crowder says that his company's legacy will be to "teach Africans the latest farming techniques", before they exit with an "18% cash on cash" return on investment.

"I don't want to defend land grabs and we're certainly not doing that," says Crowder. "My view is that Africa needs to modernise its agriculture."

But local farmers say that they have yet to see any benefit from Chayton Capital's farm or the other commercial farms in the area. "So far they don't help," says Brighton Marcokatebe, a farmer from the nearby village of Asa.

If discontent among local farmers should one day boil up into demands for the land under Chayton's control, Crowder has got his bases covered. "The World Bank has underwritten our assets for political risk," explains Crowder. "We pay a premium for insurance and they guarantee against expropriation. Our political risk insurance protects us against civil disturbance."

Friends of Crowder:

World Bank: Its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency provides Chayton Capital with US$50 million in political risk insurance for its farm holdings in in Zambia and Botswana.

PSG Group: The South African financial corporation's subsidiary, Zeder Investments, purchased a 96% stake in Chayton Africa in March 2012.

Mauritius: Provides Chayton with a tax and financial haven for its Chayton Atlas Agricultural Company.

Going further:



Michael Barton (UK)
Founder and Chief Financial Officer of Farm Lands of Africa

Michael Barton got a taste for the profits that can be made in farmland during his five years as Chairman of New Hibernia Investments Ltd, a company launched by UK real-estate player Mark Keegan to buy farms in Argentina. When Keegan's company sold its farms at a hefty profit in 2008, he and Barton turned their attention to Africa.

They enlisted the help of a former high-ranking officer in the British army, General Sir Redmond Watt, and Cherif Haidara, a Malian lobbyist intimate with West Africa's inner circles of power. Their focus turned to Guinea, a country controlled by a corrupt dictatorship with millions of hectares of agricultural land. Haidara, who was put in charge of Guinea's mining funds in October 2009, had already helped the UK company Sovereign Mines of Guinea, to which Keegan is connected, to get hold of five gold concessions covering a total of 3,600 sq km in the country's gold-rich metallogenic belts.

Guinea was in a political mess at the time. Lansana Conté, the country's dictator since 1984, had died in December 2008, and was soon replaced by a military junta. The junta held on to power from 24 December 2008 to 21 December 2010, going through two Presidents in the process. It was during this time that Barton's team struck its deals for farmland.

On 16 September 2010, with Brigadier-General Sékouba Konaté in power, Barton, by way of a newly created company called Farm Lands of Guinea (now Farm Lands of Africa – FLA), signed two deals with Guinea's Ministry of Agriculture. These deals gave Land & Resources, a subsidiary of FLA incorporated in Guinea and 10% owned by the Government of Guinea, a 99-year lease on more than 100,000 ha of agricultural land. Under a subsequent protocol, signed on 25 October 2010, while Konaté was still in power, Barton's company agreed to survey and map roughly 1.5 million ha to "prepare it for third-party development under 99-year leases." FLA maintains that, in return, the Ministry of Agriculture gave it exclusive marketing rights over the lands "with a commission of 15% being payable on closed sales." When combined, the three deals give FLA control of 1,608,215 ha, or 11% of Guinea's agricultural land. Late in 2011, FLA reported that its representatives had been prospecting for land in Sierra Leone and The Gambia, and that it had identified 10,000 ha in Mali's Office du Niger with that country's Minister of Agriculture.

Friends of Barton:

Craven House Capital: London-based financial firm, formerly called AIM Investments, bought US$1 million-worth of FLA common shares in November 2011.

British Virgin Islands: Provides FLA with a tax and financial haven for its operations.

Going further:

Coalition Coalition pour la Protection du Patrimoine Génétique Africain (COPAGEN) (contact: francis.ngang@inadesfo.net)


Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia)
The late Prime Minister of Ethiopia

Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) have ruled Ethiopia since they came to power in the first elections held after Ethiopia's civil war in 1995. Zenawi's power base was in the North and, throughout his rule, there have been tensions with the different peoples of the southern regions of the country, including Oromia, Gambela and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Region. To maintain their power in these provinces, Zenawi and his ministers exercised close control over local authorities, appointing, removing, transferring or even jailing personnel. Zenawi also suppressed dissent by censoring the media, imprisoning journalists, banning opposition parties and community organisations, manipulating elections and deploying the army and police to harass critics of his policies. From March to December 2011, Zenawi had more than 100 opposition politicians and 8 journalists arrested under a catch-all anti-terror law that threatens up to 20-year jail terms for those who merely publish a statement that prosecutors believe could indirectly encourage terrorism. Ethiopia has exiled more journalists than any other country in the world. According to Amnesty International: "Individuals and publications who hold different opinions, represent different political parties or attempt to provide independent commentary on political developments, are no longer tolerated in Ethiopia."

It is in this context that Zenawi transferred huge areas of land in the southern half of the country to foreign and domestic investors for large-scale agricultural projects. His government identified 4 million ha for this programme, 1 million more for biofuels, and another 5 million for sugar-cane plantations. By the end of 2011, 800,000 ha had been leased to foreign investors. And to prepare the terrain, Zenawi built dams, forcibly displaced communities, and used the army to quell opposition violently.

Zenawi's ruthless actions did not dampen his international support. Apart from the aid money that continues to flow in from the US, Britain and other northern donors (around US$3 billion per year), Zenawi forged ever deeper relations with India, Saudi Arabia and China, who are eager to support their companies in getting their hands on Ethiopia's farmland and other resources. Zenawi died of natural causes on 20 August 2012, and the EPRDF has shown no sign of deviating from Zenawi's land-grab legacy.

Friends of Zenawi:

World Bank - Coordinates international donor assistance that is being used by the Ethiopian Government for a villagisation programme that displaces people to make way for large-scale agricultural projects.

Going further:

Anywaa Survival Organisation, a UK-based group supporting the Anywaa peoples of Gambela, Ethiopia.
Survival International has a letter writing campaign to support the Omo Valley tribes affected by large-scale agriculture projects



Eduardo Elsztain (Argentina)
Chairman of Cresud

"We used to have farms, and cows and fruit trees," says Sofía Gatica, a resident of the community of Ituzaingó, Argentina. "But they destroyed all that and planted genetically modified (GM) soybeans. Now, when they spray the soy, they also spray us."

Sofia Gatica's daughter died at just three days old from kidney failure, caused by exposure to the agrotoxins sprayed on the soybean plantations that surround her community. The cancer rate in Ituzaingó is 40 times the national average. It is just one of the communities that has been devastated by Argentina's massive boom in soybean production, which followed the introduction of Monsanto's soybeans, genetically modified for resistance to the herbicide glyphosate. Each year, over 50 million gallons of agrotoxins are aerially sprayed on soybeans in Argentina.

The pain for some has been a bonanza for others. One of the big winners from the soybean boom has been the Argentine businessman Eduardo Elsztain, the country's largest farmland owner and one of its top producers of GM soybeans.

In the 1990s Elsztain was bankrolled by George Soros to purchase undervalued real estate in Argentina through his family company IRSA. They quickly amassed millions, and decided to use some of the profits to take over Cresud, a company with about 20,000 ha of farmland. With another major cash injection from Soros and a public offering on the Buenos Aires stock exchange, Cresud expanded its landholdings dramatically. By the end of 1998 it owned 26 farms covering 475,098 ha. When Soros sold his interest in Cresud and IRSA in 1999, Elsztain found other billionaire friends to replace him, such as Wall Street hedge-fund operator Michael Steinhardt and Canadian tycoon Edgar Bronfman.

Today Cresud's farmland holdings in Argentina total 628,000 ha, on which it produces mainly GM soybeans and cattle. The company also runs a feedlot operation in Patagonia through a joint venture with US-based Tyson, the world's largest meat company. Elsztain is now aggressively exporting Argentina's soybean boom to neighbouring countries. Over the past few years, Cresud's subsidiaries have taken over 17,000 ha in Bolivia, 142,000 ha in Paraguay, and 175,000 ha in Brazil, mainly for the production of soy. Cresud's current farmland holdings add up to 962,000 ha.

Friends of Elsztain:

Cargill: The US multinational is one of the largest buyers of soybeans from Argentina.

Heilongjiang Beidahuang Nongken Group: In June 2011, China's largest farming company set up a joint venture with Cresud to buy land in Argentina and farm soybeans for export to China.

Going further:

Sofía Gatica formed the Mothers of Ituzaingó with 16 others. In 2012 she received the Goldman Environmental Prize

Susan Payne (Canada)
CEO, Emergent Asset Management

Susan Payne is a Canadian who cut her teeth at JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs before embarking on a quest to take over large swaths of fertile African farmland with her British husband David Murrin. Payne and Murrin's UK company, Emergent Asset Management, launched their African Agricultural Land Fund in 2007, and has since acquired at least 30,000 ha in South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. They claim that it is the largest agricultural fund in Africa.

Payne speaks regularly about the pioneering work she's doing investing in African farmland. Others might balk at the risks involved in taking over fertile land in African countries where hunger and land conflicts are abundant – and then bringing in white South Africans to run the farms. But Payne and those backing her, such as the Toronto Dominion Bank of Canada, expect a big pay-off. She says that investors in Emergent will get annual returns of around 25%.

In October 2011, the husband-and-wife team announced that they were separating and dividing up Emergent. While Murrin took over Emergent Asset Management, Payne took over Emvest, the joint venture with South Africa's RusselStone Group, which runs Emergent's African Agriland Fund and its farming operations.

Friends of Payne:

Toronto Dominion Bank of Canada - Emergent's largest outside investor

Vanderbilt University - the US university's endowment fund is invested in Emrgent

Going further:

Oakland Institute's resources and reports on Emergent


Dr. Hatim Mukhtar (Saudi Arabia)
CEO, Foras International Investment Company

Hatim Mukhtar could one day be presiding over the world's largest rice farm. His company, Foras International, is in the midst of implementing a plan to produce 7 million tonnes of rice on 700,000 ha of irrigated land in Africa. Foras started with a 2,000-ha pilot rice farm in Mauritania in 2008, then took a lease on 5,000 ha in Mali’s Office du Niger, and signed an interim agreement for 5,000 ha in Senegal, in the Senegal river valley. The pilot studies in Mali are now complete, and Foras is seeking to scale up its operations to 50,000–100,000 ha. In all three of these countries there have already been tense conflicts over large-scale land grabs.

Foras is still far from its target of 700,000 ha, but Mukhtar has recently signed a flurry of deals that puts the company quite high in the ranks of global farm landlords. Since January 2010, Foras has taken 126,000 ha in Sudan's Sennar State, along the Blue Nile, signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Katsina State, Nigeria, for a US$100-million agricultural project that will begin with a pilot farm on 1,000 ha, and started negotiations with the government of the Russian Republic of Tatarstan for 10,000 ha. It is also moving ahead with a US$22 million project to build a massive, vertically integrated poultry farm near Dakar, Senegal, that will produce 4.8 million birds per year. Two companies that Mukhtar met at a business forum in Sarajevo have been brought in to develop its African poultry and cattle projects.

Behind Mukhtar stand some of the most powerful families and institutions of the Gulf States. Foras is a private company, but it operates as the investment arm of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an intergovernmental organisation with 57 member states that calls itself "the collective voice of the Muslim world". Its main shareholders and founders are the Islamic Development Bank and several conglomerates from the Gulf region, including Sheikh Saleh Kamel and his Dallah Al Barakah Group, the Saudi Bin Laden Group, the National Investment Company of Kuwait and Nasser Kharafi, the world's 48th-richest person and owner of the Americana Group.

Friends of Foras:

Islamic Development Bank (IDB) - main shareholder in FORAS

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) - FORAS is part of the OIC

Going further:



Theo De Jager (South Africa)
Vice-President AgriSA

Theo de Jager, the vice-president of South Africa's largest commercial farmers’ union, AgriSA, is also the chairman of its land affairs committee. So he's been deeply involved in his country's highly charged land reform, and has even lost a farm of his own in the process. But recently, De Jager has been doing some different work for his organisation: travelling around Africa looking for land that he and other South African farmers can acquire, on a large scale.

De Jager's first success was in Congo-Brazzaville. The government promised him and his fellow farmers as much land as they might want throughout the country, along with freedom from import duties, taxes and restrictions on the repatriation of profits. De Jager and about 15 other South Africans set up a company called Congo Agriculture, and negotiated a contract with the government for 80,000 ha. The first 48,000 ha were divided into 30 farms for the participating South African farmers. De Jager says that he's already picked out plots for himself, and intends to produce oil palm, timber and cattle.

But Congo could well be just a first step. As of early 2010, AgriSA has been engaged in negotiations for land deals with the governments of 22 African countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Mozambique, Sudan, Zambia, and even Libya.

De Jager and most of the South African farmers involved in these deals do not intend to live on the land they acquire. They will hire managers and oversee their businesses from afar. It is not so much their knowledge of farming that distinguishes them from the small farmers in the countries where they are acquiring lands, but their access to capital and integration in corporate food chains. De Jager himself moonlights as a real-estate agent; he started farming only in 1997. Before that he was an agent in the National Intelligence Service, serving as "chief information co-ordinator" in the office of the State President during the apartheid-era rule of P.W. Botha.

Friends of De Jager:
Government of South Africa: Supports AgriSA through the negotiation of bilateral investment treaties with the governments of countries where AgiSA is acquiring land.

Government of China: In 2010 AgriSa and China began discussions for a partnership under which AgriSA would help Chinese companies to identify farmland in Africa.

Standard Bank: Along with ABSA Bank and Standard Chartered, is said to be considering funding AgriSA's foreign farmland projects.

Going further:


The World Bank Group

The food price crisis of 2007–8 was a public relations disaster for the World Bank. Just months before prices hit their peak, the Bank was still telling governments that food self-sufficiency was a foolish goal. But then the governments of some major food-exporting countries, worried about the needs of their people, began to close their borders. Food prices spiked and riots flared, from Yaoundé to Mexico City, in countries that had followed the Bank's advice about the efficiency of global markets and the perils of supporting local agriculture. With countries like Malaysia bartering for food, and the number of hungry people and the profits of the grain trade’s giants at all time highs, who could trust the Bank any longer?

Nevertheless, the Bank stuck to its old tune: more export agriculture, more foreign investment. It soon got its wish, in spades.

At the height of the food crisis, a global farmland grab erupted. All the foreign investment that the Bank had for decades promised would be the nemesis of poverty and food insecurity was now flooding into countries all over the planet. But the glaring predicament for the Bank was that the money was chasing farmland occupied by peasants and pastoralists, to produce food crops for export from countries already coping with severe food insecurity. It was hard to spin this as a solution to the food crisis, espcially when the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation's Director General, Jacques Diouf, had already warned of "neo-colonialism", and even The Economist was calling it a "land grab".

But the Bank decided to give it a try anyway. Its answer: a set of "principles for responsible agroinvestment", and a global report and "knowledge centre" that it hoped would cast the Bank as the objective authority on the issue.

Few were fooled. The Bank's principles were immediately denounced by social movements, farmers' organisations and NGOs as a distraction from real action that could stop the land grabs. Its eagerly awaited report was a flop, with hardly any new data to add to what was already known, and with a wishy-washy embrace of the "win–win" potential of "large-scale land acquisitions" in the face of the damning evidence detailed in the Bank’s own report.

Plus, as many groups pointed out, the Bank itself is a land grabber. Through both its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and its International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Bank has directly invested in companies gobbling up farmland in the South. Among the IFC's dealings are a US$75-million investment in the Altima One World Agricultural Fund, which has been buying up vast areas of farmland in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe and converting it to soybean monoculture, and a US$40-million "risk participation" in financing to the Export Trading Group, which has acquired over 300,000 ha in Africa. MIGA has provided political risk insurance to several companies grabbing farmland in Africa, including the UK's Chayton Capital, acquiring land in southern Africa, and Unifruit, acquiring land in Ethiopia.

The Bank doesn't seem to understand why it has been the focus of so much of the opposition to land grabs. It is just "helping smallholders catch the wave of rising interest in farmland," says the Bank's land policy specialist Klaus Deininger

Friends of the World Bank:

Governments: the World Bank is run by its shareholders, which are governments. The countries with most voting power are the US (15.85%), Japan (6.84%), China (4.42%), Germany (4.00%), the United Kingdom (3.75%), France (3.75%), India (2.91%), Russia (2.77%), Saudi Arabia (2.77%) and Italy (2.64%).

Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR): The World Bank provides the CGIAR with US$50 million a year in completely unrestricted funds. Some of the CGIAR research centres have developed connections with companies pursuing large-scale farmland grabs.

Going further:

World Bank section at farmlandgrab.org
Friends of the Earth International's campaign to stop land grabbing has a focus on land grabs in Uganda in which the World Bank has been involved.


Antonio L. Tiu (Philippines)
CEO of Agrinurture Inc

In March 2012, China's ambassador to the Philippines was in central Luzon cutting a ribbon at a new hybrid rice demonstration farm. This was not a simple case of international cooperation. The farm is owned by Beidahuang, one of China's largest agribusiness companies and perhaps its most aggressive seeker of global farmland, and its local partner AgriNurture. For now, the companies' farms in the Philippines, covering 2,000 ha, will produce Chinese hybrid rice seeds and supply them to Filipino farmers under contract production arrangements. But eventually the two companies plan to produce the hybrid rice on their own farms. The say that they could have 10,000 ha under hybrid rice production by the end of 2012.

This is just one of the joint ventures that AgriNurture has set up over the past few years with foreign companies for the production of food crops in the Philippines. The company also has a multi-million-dollar banana plantation venture in the works in Mindanao with the People’s Government of Tianyang, Guangxi, China, as well as a farming venture with the Far Eastern Agricultural Investment Company, a consortium of Saudi companies, that plans to acquire 50,000 ha in Mindanao for the production of fruits and cereals.

AgriNuture (ANI) is owned by Tony Tiu, a young Filipino-Chinese entrepreneur and real-estate developer. Since he established the company in 2008, Tiu has quickly built it into one of the country's leading food exporters, with a focus on fresh fruit. Exports account for about half of the company's revenues, and about half of those exports go to China. While most of the company's supply currently comes from contract prodution, Tiu wants to develop his own farms and make these his primary source of supply. Plans are under way to acquire 5,000 ha in different parts of the country for fruit and vegetable farms.

Tiu built up his company through listings on the stock exchanges of both Australia and the Philippines, and through partnerships with the Landbank of the Philippines and the Department of Agriculture, which support his contract production schemes. With more and more land under its control, ANI has itself become a target of overseas farmland investors. In 2011, Cargill's hedge fund, BlackRiver, which is investing hundreds of millions of dollars in the acquisition of farms in Latin America and Asia, bought a 28% stake in AgriNurture.

Friends of Tiu:

China-Export Credit Guarantee Corp.: it is providing ANI with financial backing for its banana plantations in Mindanao.

Al Rajhi Group: Saudi conglomerate that leads the Far Eastern Agricultural Investment Company, a US$27-million investment vehicle for the acquisition of farmland in Asia, mainly for rice production. It has an MoU with AgriNurture to develop the production of pineapple, banana, rice and maize on 50,000 ha in the Philippines.

Going further:


Hou Weigui (China)
Chairman and Founder, Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE)

ZTE Corporation is China's largest telecommunications company, with operations in more than 140 countries. It was formed in 1985 by a group of state-owned companies affiliated to China's Ministry of Aerospace Industry. While it has been listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange since 2004, ZTE is still closely connected to the Chinese government.  Its largest shareholder is a holding company jointly owned by a state-owned electronics research institute in Xi’an and a state-owned company with links to the military. But in 2007, ZTE started to turn its attention to agriculture. It set up a new company, ZTE Energy, to invest in biofuels and food production in China, and to develop overseas farm operations as part of "the strategic plan on agriculture going globally laid down by the central government".

Hou Weigui and his company are slowly moving ahead with plans for acquiring farmland overseas. In 2008, ZTE purchased 258 ha in Menkao, near Kinshasa, in DR Congo, to study the potential for agriculture five degrees north and south of the equator. ZTE was so happy with the results that it bought another 600-ha farm in DR Congo in 2010. The company also moved into Sudan, where it now runs several cereal farms, and Laos, where it has a 100,000-ha concession in Chapassak Province to grow cassava with its local partner Dynasty Laos.

ZTE has high hopes for palm oil. Although it has put its 100,000-ha oil palm plantation project in DR Congo on hold "because the investment conditions and logistic conditions are not mature," it is going ahead with a programme in Indonesia and Malaysia, where the company plans to have 1 million ha under production by 2019. At present, PT ZTE Agribusiness Indonesia and its local partner PT Sinar Citra have 10,000 ha in Kalimantan, and are negotiating for another 25,000 ha.

Friends of Hou Weigui:
World Food Programme: ZTE Energy is a "qualified supplier " of the World Food Programme.

Going Further:
Peasant Confederation of Congo, by way of La Via Campesina
------------------
Here is the link to the original post.. (Link)

An interesting portal providing a Land Matrix


Conclusion: Farming is no longer frowned upon.. The future for farming does not seem to look like its going to be a commodity business.. 
Photosynthesis is the original economic engine .. Photosynthesis captures the energy of the SUN and stores it in the plant body.  Every other economic activity is dependent on this basic function and can value add.. only on this basic building block.. 
What is surprising is that .. such large farms are actually very energy intensive.. will these large farms survive in post "peak energy" economy.. Probably not!! .. 
What is happening is .. that agricultural land like Gold is limited in supply and is being accumulated due to its perceived value.. to be sold at a profit in the future.. agri-land it seems will continue to retain its value unlike other assets which might become worthless in the near future as the energy crisis deepens

Thursday, April 11, 2013

Strong Buy!!: ARKEMA to buy 25% stake in Jayant Agro Subsidiary

Arkema (Paris:AKE) and Jayant Agro have signed a joint venture agreement whereby Arkema will acquire a stake of some 25% in Ihsedu Agrochem, a subsidiary of Jayant Agro, specializing in the production of castor oil. This joint venture aims to develop castor oil production in order to provide Arkema with long-term secure and competitive access to this strategic raw material for the manufacture of its biosourced polyamides.

Jayant Agro is a leading producer of castor oil and derivatives. Its subsidiary Ihsedu Agrochem has been the pioneer of the castor oil industry in India and has an experience of over 60 years in the processing of castor seeds into oil. It has been one of Arkema's main suppliers from the outset.
Arkema is one of the leading players in the castor oil sector with the manufacture of its biosourced specialty polyamides 10 and 11. The world's sole producer of polyamide 11 for almost 60 years, in 2012 the Group acquired Chinese companies Hipro Polymers and Casda Biomaterials - respectively producers of polyamide 10 and sebacic acid from castor oil -, thereby bolstering its world leading position in biosourced specialty polyamides.

This joint venture with Jayant Agro therefore falls in line with Arkema's strategy to secure the supply of a key raw material in order to support the development of its bio-sourced specialty polyamides in fast growing applications, such as innovative materials for lighter vehicles and oil & gas extraction.
The project should be finalized in the 3rd quarter 2013.

A global chemical company and France's leading chemicals producer,Arkema is building the future of the chemical industry every day. Deploying a responsible, innovation-based approach, we produce state-of-the-art specialty chemicals that provide customers with practical solutions to such challenges as climate change, access to drinking water, the future of energy, fossil fuel preservation and the need for lighter materials. With operations in more than 40 countries, some 14,000 employees and 10 research centers, Arkema generates annual revenue of ?6.4 billion, and holds leadership positions in all its markets with a portfolio of internationally recognized brands.

Jayant Agro-Organics Ltd. (JAOL) is a public listed company, traded on Bombay Stock Exchange ltd (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange of India ltd (NSE). It is the leading the Castor Oil and Castor Oil based derivative manufacturer in India with a turnover of over ? 250 million. JAOL has the widest range of Castor Oil based chemicals and specialty chemicals in the world. Its Research and Development Centre is focused on developing new products and applications based on Castor Oil and its derivatives - delivering much more than molecules, converting the molecules to products for markets and turning ideas into solutions.


Investor Relations:
Sophie Fouillat, +33 1 49 00 86 37
sophie.fouillat@arkema.com
or
Jérome Raphanaud, +33 1 49 00 72 07
jerome.raphanaud@arkema.com
or
Press Relations:
Sybille Chaix, +33 1 49 00 70 30
sybille.chaix@arkema.com


Arkema buy of Casda and Hipro was at more than 1 times sale.. of both companies.. Jayant has sales close to 1800cr and current markep cap is just 139cr (cmp 92.5)
link to casda and hipro buy 

Archive of Jayant Agro related articles in this blog

Conclusion: We are all in it..!!  Jackpot!! as they say.. Just Buy and Buy!!!



Friday, March 15, 2013

Perfect Storm: The Killer Equation: Decaying Growth Dynamics

The economy is a surplus energy equation, not a monetary one, and growth in output (and in the global population) since the Industrial Revolution has resulted from the harnessing of ever-greater quantities of energy. But the critical relationship between energy production and the energy cost of extraction is now deteriorating so rapidly that the economy as we have known it for more than two centuries is beginning to unravel.


If one asked a representative sample of the public what economics is all about, there is a very strong likelihood that the consensus answer would be “money”. The vast majority of economists do indeed frame the debate in monetary terms. The problem with this is that the economy is not, fundamentally, a monetary construct at all. Economics is really about the art of combining tangible components (such as labour and natural resources) to meet needs. Ultimately, money is a convenient way of tokenising this process. The process itself, on the other hand, is an energy equation.

The basic misunderstanding over this point – the treatment of money as the substantive challenge, rather than as the language in which that challenge is expressed – lies at the heart of the current economic malaise. In essence, an ever-widening wedge has been driven between the monetary and the ‘real’ economies. A central argument set out in this report is that economic problems will remain insoluble for so long as policymakers concentrate on monetary issues rather than on the ‘real’ economy. We go further than this, arguing that the physical economy is, in essence, an energy system or, to be somewhat more precise, a surplus energy equation.

the commonality of energy

If one is to understand the essentially energy-based nature of the economy, it needs to be appreciated from the outset that all forms of energy – including food and work as well as such ‘obvious’ types of energy as oil, natural gas, coal and renewable's – are dimensions of the same thing. We term this vital concept the commonality of energy.

The fundamental fact of energy commonality is often obscured by the use of different units to describe and measure different forms of energy. For instance, food is measured in nutritional calories; work can be measured as kilowatt-hours (kwh); and fossil fuels tend to be expressed as gallons (of gasoline or distillate fuel), barrels or tonnes (of oil), cubic feet or cubic meters (of natural gas) and tonnes (of coal). But these differing calibrations should not be allowed to disguise the fundamental commonality of all forms of energy.

As an illustration of the commonality of energy, imagine filling the tank of a car with one gallon of gasoline, driving it until the fuel runs out, and then paying someone to push it back to the start-point. The ability of this person to do this depends, of course, upon sufficiency of nutrition, itself an energy equation. Obviously enough, the energy contained in food is converted by the human being into a capability for work, is  exhausted, and requires continuous replacement. But this process is a circular one, in that the cultivation of food is a process which itself requires energy inputs, be they the labour of human beings (most simply in planting and harvesting), the labour of animals, the employment of machinery or the direct use of energy inputs such as fertilizers.

The exercise of putting one gallon of fuel into a car, driving it until the fuel runs out and paying someone to push it back to the start-point also illustrates the huge difference between the price of energy and its value in terms of work done. According to the US Energy Information Administration, one (US) gallon of gasoline equates to 124,238 BTU of energy, which in turn corresponds to 36.4 kwh. Since one hour of human physical labour corresponds to between 74 and 100 watts, the labour-equivalent of the gasoline is in the range 364 to 492 hours of work. Taking the average of these parameters (428 hours), and assuming that the individual is paid $15 per hour for this strenuous and tedious activity, it would cost $6,420 to get the car back to the start-point. On this rough approximation, then, a gallon of fuel costing $3.50 generates work equivalent to between $5,460 and $7,380 of human labour.

One could come to a similarly leveraged calculation of the energy cost-to-price mismatch by measuring the cost of employing workers pedaling dynamo-connected exercise bicycles to generate the energy used by electrical appliances in the typical Western home, and then comparing the result with the average electricity bill. 

the great breakthroughs – agriculture and the heat-engine 

The development of society and of the economy is, in reality, a story of how mankind overcame the limitations imposed by the energy equation. In the pre-agrarian, hunter-gatherer era (which lasted for at least 40,000 years), there was an approximate energy balance, in that the energy which each person derived from his food was roughly equivalent to the energy that he or she expended in finding or catching that food. Put simply, there was no energy surplus, and consequently no society. Each person had to be self-sufficient, or perish.

The first of the two great breakthroughs in human development was the discovery of agriculture. Farming seems to have begun in the “fertile crescent”, an area which stretched from the Upper Nile through modern-day Lebanon, Israel and Syria to the basins of the Tigris and the Euphrates in what is now Iraq, and to the upper coastal regions on both sides of the Persian Gulf. This region is also known as “the cradle of civilisation”. Evidence of cultivated grain suggests that the transition from a hunter-gatherer to an agrarian way of life may first have occurred in about 9,500BC, though millennia were to elapse before some of the staples of organised agriculture (such as crop rotation and the domestication of animals) were discovered.

From an economic standpoint, the significance of the development of agriculture lay in the liberation of surplus energy. If twenty individuals or family units could now be supported by the labour of nineteen, the twentieth was freed to undertake non-subsistant activities. He or she might be engaged in making agricultural implements, bridges to improve access to fields, or mills which could grind grain into flour. Investment, properly considered, began when the energy surplus created by agriculture was deployed into the creation of capital goods instead of products for immediate consumption.

Of course, the energy surplus created by agriculture was extremely modest by later standards. It was sufficient to create a very limited range of specialist trades (such as smiths, millers and cobblers) and to provide rudimentary structures of government and law. The most complex organisations of the pre-industrial age – religious establishments, and the shipping and trading industries – were extremely simple by later standards, though trading companies did begin to point the way towards later corporate enterprises (in England, the East India Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company received their Royal Charters in 1600 and 1670, respectively, whilst the Dutch East Indies Company was established in 1602).

The importance of the discovery of agriculture lay in the creation of the first energy surplus, because it would be this surplus that would make possible the vastly greater advances of the second breakthrough. As Daniel Webster put it, “When tillage begins, other arts follow. The farmers, therefore, are the founders of human civilization.” 

Following the discovery of agriculture, the second (and vastly greater) breakthrough in the development of society and the economy was the invention of the heat engine, which enabled mankind to access the vast energy resources contained in coal, oil, natural gas and other exogenous (non-human) sources.

Although, in antiquity, Archytas of Tarentum and Hero of Alexandria seem to have played around with jets of steam – and gunpowder was discovered in China almost a thousand years ago – it is generally accepted that the invention of the true heat engine occurred in 1769, when Scottish engineer James Watt (1736-1819) patented his steam engine. Although it is arguable that the truly efficient heat engine did not arrive until 1799 – when English inventor Richard Trevithick (1771-1833) built a high-pressure steam engine, and applied it to drive the first locomotive – the industrial revolution was well under way by the end of the eighteenth century



The real importance of the industrial revolution lay in harnessing exogenous energy resources to apply vast leverage to the economy. Fig. 5.1 shows the truly enormous increase in the consumption of fossil fuels since the onset of the industrial revolution. Fig. 5.2 shows how, as typified by the United States, this expansion has been reflected in an equally-dramatic increase in economic output measured as real GDP.

 As well as contributing to a massive quantitative increase in the economy, the energy dynamic has resulted in the extraordinary social and economic complexity and specialisation that are an accepted part of the modern economy. In the agrarian era, the overwhelming majority of people laboured on the land, and nonagricultural trades were not only few in number but, for the most part, were closely associated with farming. In today’s developed economies, agricultural labour occupies only a very small minority of the workforce, with the majority engaged in an almost bewildering array of specialised occupations, trades and professions, the vast majority of which have no relationship whatsoever to agriculture.

exponential population, exponential energy


A glance at figs. 5.1 and 5.2 reveals a distinctive common feature, which is that the trajectories both of energy consumption and real economic output display clear exponential characteristics, something which is equally apparent in fig. 5.3, which charts global population numbers since 2000BC.

Historians estimate that the population of the world totalled about 27 million in 2000BC, and grew only very gradually thereafter, rising to 170 million two millennia later. As recently (historically speaking) as 1400, the population of the world still totalled only 350 million, and did not reach the first billion until 1840, by which time the Industrial Revolution was well under way. 

Thereafter, however, population growth accelerated very rapidly, reaching 2 billion by 1930, 3 billion by 1960, and 6 billion by 2000. The total recently passed 7 billion, should reach 8 billion well before 2030, and could be 9.3 billion (or more) by 2050.

If resources were infinite, this progression would be of little or no significance other than to sufferers from agoraphobia. Since resources are not infinite, however, some experts postulate a maximum global carrying capacity somewhere within the 8.5 and 11 billion range shown on the chart (though others believe that, under certain conditions, even the lower end of this range may become wildly over-optimistic).



The striking feature of the exponential growth in the global population over the past two-and-a-half centuries is the way in which it parallels similarly exponential growth in the consumption of energy (fig. 5.4). Before about 1750, the consumption of energy was almost entirely untraded, and therefore impossible to measure, but it was also too small to show up. In 1750, annual consumption of fossil-based energy (consisting at that time entirely of solid fuels) was about 3 million tonnes of oil-equivalent. (mmtoe), rising, pretty dramatically, to about 52 mmtoe by 1850.

Oil did not become a measurably significant component of the energy total until 1870, by which time fossil fuel consumption had reached an estimated 142 mmtoe. Thereafter, this total escalated, to 200 mmtoe by 1880 and 400 mmtoe by 1895. The total exceeded 1,000 mmtoe in the late 1920s, reaching 2,000 mmtoe by the mid-1950s and almost 4,500 mmtoe by 1970. By the end of the 1980s – and despite intervening energy price shocks – consumption exceeded 7,000 mmtoe. Energy consumption broke through the 8,000 mmtoe barrier in 2000, and exceeded 9,000 mmtoe just four years after that. In 2010, and despite the onset of the economic slump in 2008, total fossil fuel consumption exceeded 10,000 mmtoe.

the subservient role of money

Though economists, policymakers, investors and the general public customarily think in terms of money, this conventional thinking is profoundly mistaken because, ultimately, the economy is a physical rather than a financial construct. Rather than being in any sense fundamental, money serves to tokenise output into a convenient form. After all, the world economy has survived the demise of an estimated 3,800 different paper currencies. 

The roles of money can be defined as a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. The development of money paralleled the emergence of agriculture, the role of money being to tokenise the output of the economy into a convenient form. Obviously, the creation of money was a secondary stage in the economic process, as there was no point in having money unless there were things that could be purchased with it, and the physical economy formalised by money was, as we have seen, an energy dynamic of inputs and outputs.

It is important to note that, in the agrarian age, anything that could be purchased with money was the product of human (or animal) labour, be that labour past, present or future. Purchasing, say, a plough amounted to paying for a product of past labour. Employing someone to plant a field involved payment for current labour. Commissioning someone to build an item of furniture meant paying for future labour. 

As we have seen, however, the terms ‘labour’ and ‘energy’ are coterminous through the commonality of energy, so anything which could be purchased with money was the product of energy, past, present or future.

With the broader term ‘energy’ replacing ‘labour’, exactly the same relationship prevails in the industrial societies of today, except that exogenous energy inputs (overwhelmingly dominated by fossil fuels) now provide the vast majority of the energy used in the economy. So overwhelming is this preponderance that, in Britain today, human labour probably accounts for less than 0.5% of the aggregate human-plus-inputs energy used in the economy. In other words, all goods and services on which money can be spent are the products of energy inputs either past, present or future.

The appreciation of the true nature of money as a tokenisation of energy also enables us to put debt into its proper context. Fundamentally, debt can be defined as ‘a claim on future money’. However, since we have seen that money is a tokenisation of energy, it becomes apparent that debt really amounts to ‘a claim on future energy’. Our ability, or otherwise, to meet existing debt commitments depends upon whether the real (energy) economy of the future will be big enough to make this possible. 

Therefore, the viability (or otherwise) of today’s massively-indebted economies depends upon the outlook for energy supply. If one chooses to believe that the exponential expansion in energy use that has powered the growth of the economy (and the global population) since the dawn of the industrial age can continue into the future, debts may be serviceable and repayable out of the economic (for which read ‘energy’) enlargement of the future. If such enlargement cannot be relied upon, however, then the debt burden can only be regarded as unsustainable.

Where debt is concerned, individuals and businesses have only two possible courses of action – they can repay their debts, or they can default. Governments, however, have a third option, which is to repay debts using money newly created for the purpose. Instead of the ‘hard’ default of reneging on debt obligations, government can opt for the ‘soft’ default of ‘repaying’ their debts in a currency which has been devalued by inflation. 

In any case, the real value of money is subject to a constant process of destruction as its value is eroded by inflation. According to official figures, even the US dollar – one of the most resilient currencies that the world has ever known – lost 87% of its purchasing power between 1961 and 2011. To regard money as the building-block of the economy is profoundly mistaken.

at Hubbert’s Peak?

As we have seen, then, the economy is, in reality, an energy dynamic onto which has been grafted not just a system of monetary tokenisation but, much more seriously, a system of anticipatory finance which is viable if (but only if) it can be assumed that there will be no significant check to the process of exponential economic growth. Of course, the most obvious threat to this anticipatory economic system would arise if the availability of energy were to diminish (or even simply cease to increase in the way that anticipatory finance necessarily assumes). Since the 1950s, this threat has acquired a name – “peak oil”. 



This peak oil concept – pioneered by M. King Hubbert and accordingly known as ‘Hubbert’s Peak’ - contends that, at some time in the relatively near future, we will have consumed half of all originally-available reserves of oil. This concept is illustrated in fig. 5.5, which combines past consumption data with a representative subsequent downwards curve.

At that point, Hubbertians argue, the supply of oil will decline, in pretty much a mirror-image of the increase in consumption which has taken place since the 1850s. Much the same, they argue, will eventually happen to supplies of natural gas and of coal, with depletion of these sources accelerating as a result of substitution from oil.

The peak oil process can already be discerned in the context of individual provinces such as the UK North Sea, or of multi-province plays such as the Lower Forty-Eight (L48) States of the US. Annual rates of petroleum discovery in America peaked in 1930, and peak production occurred forty years later, in 1970, since when output has declined relentlessly. Since the global peak discovery rate occurred in the mid-1960s, it has been argued, a similar time-lag implies that global peak oil is now imminent.



Advocates of the peak oil interpretation argue that, seen on a timescale of social evolution, the era of the petroleum-based society is not so much a manageable trend (fig.5.6) as a one-off event (fig.5.7, which depicts exactly the same data as 5.6, but extends the time-scale from two hundred to four thousand years). Again, it has been argued that this same interpretation applies to other fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas, and that the current chapter in economic history amounts to nothing more than a one-off event in which mankind has squandered a multimillion-year energy inheritance in an evolutionarily-brief moment of history.

As we have seen, a distinct exponential pattern links global population, energy consumption and, it should be added, a host of other linked parameters including economic output and food supply. If the availability of energy is the critical exponential driver in this agglomeration, might a reversal in the energy exponential bring all of the others crashing down?

To be sure, reversing any of the critical exponential progressions (be it energy availability, economic growth or population expansion) will be painful Indeed, society has absolutely no prior guide to how to manage successive (and perhaps rapid) decreases in population and in economic output.A mass collapse of exponential's could be catastrophic.

The classic Hubbertian argument is that oil production must soon enter an inexorable decline, because half of the world’s originally-recoverable petroleum has already been extracted. The first flaw in this argument is that it is simply not true. The application of the Hubbert thesis at this point implies that reserves were of the order of 2,200 bn bbls (billion barrels). Ample evidence exists to suggest that the originally recoverable reserves base was at least 3,000 to 3,500 bn bbls, and very possibly much larger. The Hubbertian case has considerable merit if it is applied to conventional oil, by which is meant light, sweet crudes which can be extracted relatively easily. But there is seemingly incontrovertible evidence that huge quantities of unconventional oils remain to be extracted. 

In North America, tar sands reserves in Canada are estimated at no less than 170 bn bbls (billion barrels), whilst shales in the US alone may hold as much as 1,400 bn bbls of oil, though the extraction of much of that oil may be, to put it mildly, problematical. In South America, reserves of very heavy crudes in Venezuela are thought to be well in excess of 350 bn bbls. To be sure, there seem to be many cases of overstatement where conventional reserves are concerned, most notably in OPEC countries, where, for many years, the quota allocation process incentivised the over-statement of reserves. But the overall picture is one of relative abundance of reserves of oil of all types.

The second error within the Hubbert’s Peak theory is that it tends to ignore economics. A scarcity of oil would cause prices to rise massively. As we have seen, a US gallon of gasoline costs about $3.50 but, in energy terms, displaces human labour worth perhaps $6,400. Scarcity-induced price escalation could be expected to change this equation in at least two material respects. 

First, a dramatic escalation in prices would reduce demand by causing greater frugality in the use of oil. As world-leading energy expert Robert Hirsch argued (in a thesis that essentially leant towards the concept of an oil production peak), there is a great deal that can be done to mitigate the economic impact of oil shortages, always presupposing that action is taken at least ten years ahead of the event.

A society threatened by oil scarcity would be required to change fundamentally. Suburbs – the quintessential characteristic of a car-based society – would be replaced by denser forms of habitation in a move that might yet be rendered necessary anyway by environmental considerations. The thirstiest vehicles (such as SUVs22) would be consigned rapidly to the scrap-heap, and private car ownership would be displaced by public transport. The second effect of very high oil prices would be to incentivise exploration for, and development of, resources currently rendered uneconomic by their geological nature or their inaccessible location. 

These arguments – and the apparent scale of remaining recoverable reserves – have generally enabled peak oil sceptics (sometimes known as ‘cornucopians’) to counter the Hubbertians and thereby, in general, to win the public debate.

In so doing, they are providing the right answers to the wrong question. The critical issue with peak oil does not hinge around remaining reserves. Rather, the critical issues are energy returns on energy invested (EROEI) and deliverability. 

The best way to illustrate the deliverability issue is to compare oil sands reserves in Canada (about 170 bn bbls) with conventional reserves in Saudi Arabia (about 270 bn bbls). Given that Saudi production capacity is about  12 mmb/d (million barrels per day), one might, on a simple pro-rata basis, expect Canadian oil sands output to reach perhaps 7 mmb/d. But the reality is that output is most unlikely to reach even 3.5 mmb/d. Deliverability from the Canadian resource, will, then, be less than half of that attained from conventional reserves in Saudi Arabia.

Not surprisingly, and for perfectly logical economic reasons, oil reserves have been ‘cherry-picked’, meaning that the cheapest, highest-quality and most accessible reserves have been exploited first. What this in turn means is that, even if reserves remain substantial, production levels might hit a ceiling in the relatively near future. It also needs to be remembered that net changes in output represent a two-piece equation -substantial new sources are needed each year simply to replace natural declines from already producing fields. As the industry moves from higher- to lower-deliverability fields, maintenance of existing production levels, let alone growth, becomes ever more difficult.



In the 2007 issue of the World Oil Outlook, OPEC predicted that global consumption of oil would rise to 114 mmb/d by 2030, amounting to a 31% increase over expected 2010 demand of 87.5 mmb/d. Five years on, the demand projection for 2030 had been reduced from 114 mmb/d to 101 mmb/d, whilst consumption in 2010 turned out to be a lot lower (84.9 mmb/d) than OPEC had expected in 2007 (87.5 mmb/d)23 (fig. 5.8). The significance of these figures is that the downgrading of OPEC’s future demand forecasts resulted from the sharp lowering in economic growth expectations that occurred between 2007 and 2012. 



Though appreciably lower than the cartel’s estimate five years ago (114 mmb/d), the current projection for oil demand in 2030 nevertheless represents a big (19%) increase from the out-turn in 2010 (84.9 mmb/d). Is this achievable? We doubt it, not least because supply from existing sources of oil is declining by about 6.7% annually. On this basis, an overall supply increase of 14.4 mmb/d between 2012 and 2030 would require the development of new sources delivering 76.4 mmb/d (more three quarters of all output) by the latter date (fig. 5.9). This seems extremely improbable, not least because of the deliverability issue described earlier.

Moreover, future supply projections assume that a large proportion of all future net gains in production will have to come from OPEC countries. This might be difficult to achieve, particularly given that Saudi Aramco admits that it is injecting 13 mmb/d of treated seawater, most of it to sustain production at its giant (but ageing)Al Ghawar field, historically the source of about half of the kingdom’s production. 

Another way to look at the deliverability issue is that reserves need to be quality-weighted. We may have used up much less than half of the world’s originally-recoverable reserves of oil, but we have, necessarily, resorted first to those reserves which are most readily and cheaply recovered. The reserves that remain are certain to be more difficult and costlier to extract. 

Production may not ‘peak’ just yet, but a new concept (which we term ‘resource constraint’) may soon kick in, implying that an economic model based on abundant and ever-increasing hydrocarbon inputs might be running out of road. 

Neither should policymakers be fooled by the cornucopians’ argument that technology will necessarily ride to the rescue. As remarked earlier, this argument is essentially equivalent to the statement that, if one locked some boffins up in a bank vault with enough cash and a powerful enough computer, they would eventually materialise a ham sandwich. Technology is not the Seventh Cavalry, poised to ride to the rescue.

energy returns – the killer equation

An absolute decline in available energy volumes, serious though that would be, is not the immediate concern. The truly critical issue is the relationship between energy extracted and the amount of energy consumed in the extraction process. Known as the Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI), this is the ‘killer equation’ where the viability of the economy is concerned. Put very simply, there is no point whatsoever in producing 100 barrels of oil (or its equivalent in other forms of energy) if 100 barrels (or more) are consumed in the extraction process. 

Though described earlier as an energy equation, a more precise definition of the economy is that it is a surplus energy dynamic, driven by the difference between energy extracted and energy consumed in the extraction process. As we have seen, society and the economy began when agriculture liberated the first energy surplus. Subsequent economic history has been a process of increasing that surplus by harnessing ever-larger quantities of surplus energy.

The mathematics of EROEI are pretty straightforward. If the EROEI is 50:1, this means that 50 units are extracted for each unit invested in the extraction process. The division here is 50:1 between ‘profit’ and ‘cost’ energy, meaning that the net ‘cost’ of energy is 1.96% (1 divided by 51). Similarly, the ‘energy cost of energy’ is 0.99% (1/101) at an EROEI of 100:1, 3.8% (1/26) at 25:1 and 9.1% (1/11) at 10:1.



The best form of graphical presentation of EROEI is the “cliff chart” (fig. 5.10). The horizontal axis shows EROEI as a multiple, running in this instance from 100:1 to zero. The vertical axis divides gross energy produced into “profit” (the dark, lower area on the chart) and “cost” energy (the light area). At an EROEI of 100:1, the picture is overwhelmingly one of “profit”, in a profit-to-cost percentage ratio of 99:1. The percentage ratio remains very strong (98:2) at 50:1,and is still robust (96:4) at 25:1.



Below an EROEI of about 15:1, however, the “profit” element falls off a cliff, because there is an exponential increase in the “cost” component, which rises from 4.8% at an EROEI of 20:1 to 6.3% at 15:1, 9.1% at 10:1 and 16.7% at 5:1. This process of “cost” escalation is illustrated in fig. 5.11, which shows that energy cost is yet another addition to the collection of exponential progressions (including population, energy consumption and economic output) which dominate the world as we know it. This time, however, the exponential progression is a negative one. 

It is important to emphasise that the cliff chart depicted in fig. 5.10 is not time-linear. Even so, and as fig. 5.12 makes clear, the progression in energy sourcing is moving unmistakably and inexorably towards ever lower EROEIs. 

Oil discoveries in the 1930s offered EROEIs well in excess of 100:1, whereas this ratio had declined to about 30:1 by the 1970s, and few discoveries today offer an EROEI of much better than 10:1. In the heroic pre-War days of the oil industry, the ratio was high, because a small energy investment (often consisting of little more than rudimentary onshore drilling and wellhead equipment) could access extremely large oil fields. By the 1970s, these ‘easy’ (low-cost) sources were well on the way to being exhausted, and the industry was developing fields which were both smaller and costlier, an increasing proportion being offshore. 

The petroleum industry has shown enormous resourcefulness in developing techniques such as water- and gas-injection, horizontal drilling, remote production and various forms of advanced oil recovery (AOR) as discoveries have become ever more technically and geographically challenging, but the underlying trend has been a relentless deterioration in EROEIs as costs have risen and average field sizes have declined. 

Believers in peak oil have seen this progression as an indication of evergrowing reserves stress, which indeed it is. But the real economic significance of this progression lies in a rapid deterioration in EROEIs rather than in an exhaustion of absolute reserves. The overall EROEI of the North Sea today may be no higher than about 5:1, a far cry from ratios in excess of 100:1 yielded by the pioneering discoveries  in the sands of Arabia. 

Much the same applies to other fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas. Where coal is concerned, fuel quality has deteriorated just as costs have risen. Almost all of the world’s original reserves of anthracite (the best coal in terms of energy content per tonne) have already been exhausted, pushing miners into ever greater reliance on bituminous and even sub-bituminous coals, the latter offering barely half the energy content per tonne of bituminous coal.

Newer energy sources display a similarly disturbing trend. At first glance, the claimed EROEIs for onshore wind power look pretty reasonable at perhaps 17:1. However, the returns claimed for wind seem to make some pretty heroic assumptions about the longevity of generating plant and, in any case, wind turbines produce electricity, not the highly-concentrated transport fuels upon which the economy depends. 

Other energy sources look even worse in EROEI terms. Biofuel EROEIs seldom exceed 3:1, and some are negative. The much-vaunted “hydrogen economy” is a myth, because hydrogen acts as a store (not a source) of energy, and is very inefficient in the way in which it converts energy obtained from conventional sources. About 40% of the initial energy is lost in conversion, perhaps another 15% is lost in the collection process and, if the hydrogen energy is reconverted into electricity, the process losses mean that one finishes with barely 15% of the energy put into the process in the first place. 

Policymakers who pin their hopes on unconventional hydrocarbon sources are guilty of a quite extraordinary degree of self-delusion. The EROEI of surface-mined tar sands is probably little better than 3:1 (if that), and those sands (accounting for about four-fifths of the total) which cannot be surface-mined can only be extracted using massively energy-intensive techniques such as SAGD (steamassisted gravity drive), such that EROEIs are minimal, or even negative. 

The latest fashion in collective delusion concerns shale gas and oil. These may indeed exist in vast quantities, but EROEIs of barely 5:1 should make it abundantly clear that shales most emphatically are not the quick-fix that many governments (and their electorates) might like to suppose.

where are we now?

As we have seen, then, there is an unmistakable trend towards lower energy returns on energy invested, with EROEIs falling within the fossil fuels slate just as society is turning both to renewables (such as wind power and biofuels) and to unconventional sources of hydrocarbon energy (including tar sands and shale gas). The critical question (though it is one to which scandalously little official attention has been devoted) has to be that of where the world is in terms of the overall EROEI, and where this critical equation may be heading. 

In an excellent discussion published in 2010, analyst Andrew Lees suggests that the overall EROEI, having declined from 40:1 in 1990 to 20:1 in 2010, might fall to as little as 5:1 by 2020. Though Mr Lees does not cite sources for these numbers, his figures for 1990 and 2010 accord pretty closely with our own estimates. 

Policymakers must hope that he is very wrong indeed, however, about the global average EROEI in 2020 because, if this ratio does indeed decline to just 5:1 over the coming seven years, the economy as we know it is finished. It is as simple as that. 

The cost point here is critical. At the 40:1 ratio cited by Andrew Lees for 1990, the theoretical cost of energy would have been 2.43% (1/41) of GDP. If the correct figure for 2010 was indeed 20:1, then the ratio in that year would have been 4.76% (1/21), a painful increase since 1990 but, nevertheless, a ratio at which the surplus energy economy can still function. 

At a ratio of 5:1, however, energy would absorb 16.67% (1/6) of GDP, meaning that energy costs would have increased by 250% (16.67 compared with 4.76) over just ten years. Put very simply, and ignoring (for now) intervening inflation, this would be equivalent to the annual average reference price of Brent crude oil having soared from $79.50/bbl to almost $280/bbl.



Our own analysis begins with an estimate of the overall cost of energy as a percentage of global GDP, which is plotted for the period since 1965 in fig. 5.13. Energy costs, historically very low before 1973, were driven to extremely high levels by the oil crises of the 1970s before falling back markedly in response both to demand destruction and to the incentivisation of previously non-commercial sources of supply. 

As a result, energy was remarkably cheap during the 1980s and 1990s, averaging perhaps 3.1% of GDP between 1986 and 1999, compared with an estimated peak of almost 15% in 1979. 

Of course, and as we have seen, the value and the cost of energy are very different concepts, and short- and medium-term cost oscillation can be created by political and economic events largely unrelated to underlying fundamentals. Even so, we believe that there is sufficient alignment over the longer term in the relationship between EROEI and cost for us to plot an estimated EROEI trend (in its costequivalent form) on a ‘best-fit’ basis. 

Remember that what is being measured here is not the value of energy, but its cost as a proportion of the value that we derive from it. Cost and value could only be the same if no surplus existed, which would also mean that the economy could not exist either. 

Our assessment of the trend in EROEIs is shown as the red line in fig. 5.13. On this basis, our calculated EROEIs both for 1990 (40:1) and 2010 (17:1) are reasonably close to the numbers cited for those years by Andrew Lees. For 2020, our projected EROEI (of 11.5:1) is not as catastrophic as 5:1, but would nevertheless mean that the share of GDP absorbed by energy costs would have escalated to about 9.6% from around 6.7% today. Our projections further suggest that energy costs could absorb almost 15% of GDP (at an EROEI of 7.7:1) by 2030.

Though our forecasts and those of Mr Lees may differ in detail, the essential conclusion is the same. It is
that the economy, as we have known it for more than two centuries, will cease to be viable at some point within the next ten or so years unless, of course, some way is found to reverse the trend. 

This point requires further explanation.

EROEI decline – the road from wealth to poverty

When looking at how a sharp decline in EROEI affects the economy, we need to take note of two key points. The first of these is that the slump in energy returns means that an ever-higher share of total output will be absorbed by the cost of energy, meaning that less value remains for all other purposes. The second is that energy is central to the entire economy, and that its effects go far beyond the obvious ‘costs’ of energy-related activities such as transport and the generation of power. 



Let’s start with the straightforward EROEI equation by comparing a high- and a low-EROEI economy, represented here by figs. 5.14 and 5.15. Each chart subdivides the totality of produced energy into three streams. The red component is the proportion of the extracted energy which has to be reinvested into the extraction process, whether as infrastructure (capital) or in extraction (operating) expense. 

In a high-EROEI economy (fig. 5.14), the reinvestment requirement is small, leaving most of the produced energy to be used to power the economy. Of this, some – shown in light blue – is used for essential purposes, such as food production and the provision of healthcare, law and government. The remainder, shown in dark blue and substantial in the high-EROEI economy, powers all discretionary activities, including all other forms of consumption and investment.

If EROEI falls sharply, as in fig. 5.15, much more of the gross energy is consumed in the extraction process,
resulting in a corresponding squeeze on the energy available to the economy. The essentials may still be affordable, but the leverage in the equation is such that energy available for discretionary uses diminishes
very rapidly indeed. There, through the EROEI squeeze, goes the car, the holiday, the bigger home, the MP3, the meal out, toys for the children, the afternoon at the golf club or the soccer match. If EROEI falls materially, our consumerist way of life is over.

There are two really nasty stings in the tail of a declining EROEI. First, net energy availability may fall below the amount required for essential purposes including healthcare, government and law. It is hardly too much to say that a declining EROEI could bomb societies back into the pre-industrial age. 

Indeed, a decrease in net energy below subsistence levels is an implicit consequence of EROEI decline beyond a certain point – one which is difficult to estimate, but is likely to occur within the next decade – which means that this is when the nastiest results of all start happening. 

Second, of course, a decline in net energy availability could (indeed, almost certainly will) result in conflict driven by competition for access to diminishing surplus energy resources

an unfolding collapse? 

As we have seen, energy is completely central to all forms of activity, so the threat posed by a sharp decline in net energy availability extends into every aspect of the economy, and will affect supplies of food and water, access to other resources, and structures of government and law.

The story of modern agriculture is one of feeding an ever-growing global population from an essentially finite resource base. At the time of population theorist Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), it would have seemed inconceivable that the world population could increase from 870 million in 1810 to 6,900 million in 2010. That this has been achieved has been solely due to the application of exogenous energy to agriculture, a process which has created an expansion in food production which has exceeded the 7.9x increase in human numbers over the same period.

Essentially, there are two ways in which agricultural output can be increased. The first is to bring more
land into production, which has indeed happened, but virtually all viable farmland was under cultivation
by 1960.

The second is to increase output per hectare, which is what the “green revolution” has achieved – between
1950 and 1984, for example, global grain production increased by about 250%. 

The snag with this, of course, is that the green revolution has, overwhelmingly, been the product of energy inputs. Most obviously, planting, harvesting, processing and distribution have been made possible by fossil fuels, principally oil. Fertilizers have been sourced from natural gas, whilst most pesticides are made from petroleum. The impact of energy inputs on agricultural productivity cannot be calculated exactly, but some estimates suggest that these inputs have increased output per hectare by at least 85%. The apparent implication – which is that food production might decline by almost half if these inputs became unavailable – is almost certainly a severe understatement, because it ignores both the leeching of naturally-occurring nutrients and the conditioning of the land to input intensive monoculture.

It seems highly probable that recent food crises are directly linked to rising energy costs, and that escalating food prices owe at least as much to energy constraint as to continuing increases in the global population. Of course, the cultivation of crops for fuels worsens the squeeze on food availability and, as we have seen, offers such low EROEIs that it is a wholly futile response to the squeeze on energy supplies. 

The knock-on effects of energy constraint go far beyond food issues, serious though these are. The production of most minerals would be uneconomic without access to relatively inexpensive energy. The giant Bingham Canyon mine in Utah, for example, produces copper at concentrations of about 0.25%, which means that some 400 tonnes of rock must be shifted for each tonne of copper produced, a process that is hugely energy-intensive. Most plastics are derived from either oil or natural gas. Desalination is extremely energy intensive, which means that any sharp escalation in energy costs will undercut an increasingly important source of fresh water. Current plans call for the quantities of water produced by desalination to increase from 68 mmc (million cubic metres) in 2010 to 120 mmc3 in 2020, a plan which looks wildly unrealistic if the availability of net energy is declining at anything like the rate that our analysis of trends in EROEI suggests

The logic of a deteriorating EROEI suggests that investment in energy infrastructure will grow much more rapidly than the economy as a whole in a process that has been called ‘energy sprawl’. In essence, declining productivity means that the energy infrastructure must increase more rapidly than the volume of produced energy, and this process is clearly under way, though principally in the emerging economies (where energy demand continues to increase) rather than in the developed world. This is most evident in the massive investment that is being poured into all aspects of the energy chain in China. 

The calculations here are daunting. If we assume (for the sake of simplicity) that real GDP remains constant over a ten-year period in which the overall EROEI declines from 20:1 to 10:1, energy costs must rise at a compound annual rate of 7.4% whilst the rest of the economy shrinks by 0.5% per year.

knowing the score

Where the surplus energy equation is concerned, one question remains – how will we know when the decline sets in? The following are amongst the most obvious decline-markers:

- Energy price escalation. 

The inflation-adjusted market prices of energy (and, most importantly, of oil) move up sharply, albeit in a zig-zag fashion as price escalation chokes off economic growth and imposes short-term reverses in demand.

- Agricultural stress. 

This will be most obvious in more frequent spikes in food prices, combined with food
shortfalls in the poorest countries.

- Energy sprawl. 

Investment in the energy infrastructure will absorb a steadily-rising proportion of global capital investment.

- Economic stagnation.

 As the decline in EROEIs accelerates, the world economy can be expected to become increasingly sluggish, and to fail to recover from setbacks as robustly as it has in the past.

- Inflation.

 A squeezed energy surplus can be expected to combine with an over-extended monetary economy to create escalating inflation.With the exception (thus far) of inflation, each of these features has become firmly established in recent years, which suggests that the energy surplus economy has already reached its tipping-point


PN: this in an extract from Financial Times document.

The original document first covers other reasons for the Zero Growth future.. and tackles energy issue at the end. Though the most important issue is the energy issue. The take away is to understand what we can do to reduce the consumption/waste of energy that happens all around. 

A more important step would be to make lifestyle changes, public transport, railways instead of air travel. I see a future of joint family system. Future ready jobs is also a must and assets that will hold value in the future.. 



Tuesday, March 12, 2013

Jayant Agro Organics: Under Reporting Profits: Export Incentives


Jayant Agro Organics as per Annual Report March 2012: (Link to Annual Report March 2012)

Consolidated Export Incentives Receiveable: 254,631,185 (25.46Cr) (Page 70)

We all know that reported Consolidated Net Profit by Jayant agro  for year ended March 2012: 313,521,057 (31.35Cr).. with export incentives of 25.46Cr I think the profits seem too low..

Lets try and follow the trail of Export Incentives and see if we can link the pieces together.

Page 60 of the March 2012 Annual report states:
"Turnover includes Sale of Goods, Services, Scrap, Export Incentives and are net of sales tax/Value Added Tax and Excise Duty."

Turnover is also known as Topline, Sales and part of Income statement
Lets go and look at the detailed Turnover data provided in the March 2012 Annual Report (Profit Loss/Income statement):



Page 57: Consolidated Statement of Profit and Loss for the Year Ended March 2012.
We can see :
Revenue from Operations: 18,322,618,019 (1,832.26Cr) 
Other Income: 60,960,459 (6.09Cr)

This is high level and no break up for revenue is provided.. lets look at the notes 20,21 where we should get detailed info.. and the export incentive as mentioned in revenue recognition statement.

--------------------------------------

Looking at the detailed breakup of Revenue from Operations and Other Income as mentioned in Note 20 and 21 of Annual Report March 2012 


There is a line Item for Foreign Exchange Gain, Power Generation Income, Interest Income, Dividend income, Refund of duties and claims.. all these line items detailed in the Revenue from Operations (Note 20) and Other Income (Note 21) of value less than Export Incentive (25.46Cr) 

Surprisingly 25.46Cr worth of export incentives are not identified as a separate Line Item in the Revenue Section when.. its stated that Revenue/Turnover Includes Export Incentives.
-----------------------------

Question is Where are the export incentives.. how did I get that number 25.46Cr
Page 70 Note 19.


Export Incentive Receivable: 254,631,185 (25.46Cr)

Export Incentives are entered as a Receivable and hence entered as "Other Current Assets" which get added into the Balance Sheet and completely skipped out of the Income (Profit Loss) statement.


Also a careful observation worth mentioning
Export Incentive Receivable 2012:  254,631,185  (25.46Cr)
Export Incentive Receivable 2011:  271,772,800  (27.17Cr)


Page 73 Annual Report March 2012:

FOB Value of Export 2012 : 14,690,215,918 (1469.02Cr)
FOB Value of Export 2011 :  8,835,132,460 (883.51Cr)

FOB Export value has increased from 2011 to 2012 by 66.27% while the Export incentive receivable has reduced from 27.17Cr (2011) to 25.46Cr (2012) a reduction of 6.2% in export incentive receivable.


My understanding..
"Export Incentive receivable" is lower as its most likely a Quarterly/half yearly figure and not a full year figure.
Since Balance Sheet is prepared as of 31 March the last Quarterly/halfyearly payment is still due and hence a "receivable"  ... 

So the question is "What is the Full Year Export Incentive" 

Why its missing from the Income statement while other small line items which are of lesser value mentioned in the Income statement?

- Export Incentives are missing from the Income statement .. though they are mentioned as part of balance sheet. 
- "Export Incentive Receivable" is a subset of the Total Export Incentive received in a year because Export Incentive should have increased by same amount as increase in exports (Year on Year)

What should be the impact on bottomline of export incentive. 
Case1:
Net Profit Reported for March 2012:  31.35Cr
Export Incentive Receivable not included in Income statement: 25.46Cr (assuming this as full year export incentive)

Hypothetical Net Profit for March 2012: 31.35+ 25.46 = 56.81Cr
--------------------
Case 2:
Now if we consider that with a 66.27% increase in exports over 2011 actual export incentives should have also increased by 66.27% over 2011. 
2011 Export Incentive: 27.17Cr (assuming this is full year export incentive)
Hypothetical Export Incentive 2012 (66.27% higher than 2011): 45.17Cr

Hypothetical Net Profit (with increased export incentive): 45.17Cr + 31.35 = 76.52Cr
--------------------


Conclusion: Jayant Agro Organics Reported Net Profit for March 2012: 31.35Cr on sales of 1832.26Cr which is 1.71% of its sales. a very low figure making the business an unattractive investment. Reading through the Annual Report for March 2012 we observe that Export Incentive Receivable is worth 25.46Cr and not included in the Income statement of Jayant Agro Organics. 
Another observation is that in 2012 Export sales have increased by 66.27% while reported Export incentives have fallen .. which is again an anomaly 
A hypothetical Net Profit number based on two conditions bring us to a Hypothetical Net Profit of: 56.81Cr and 76.52Cr which then translates to a Net Profit margin of: 3.10% and 4.1% (realistic figure)

The other point is when Net Profit was 31.35Cr PBDIT was 88.88Cr with hypothetical Net Profit range of 56.81 to 76.52Cr .. PBDIT range is: 114.34Cr to 134.05Cr .. Now Current Market Cap of Jayant is just 144Cr (CMP: 96.20) .. So right now Jayant is hypothetically quoting at close to 1 times hypothetical PBDIT.. and hence Very Very Cheap.. These are based on Export Incentive Receivable.. not actual export incentives Received (which is not provided in Annual Report March 2012) so still represent a conservative estimate of PBDIT and Net Profit.


Please Note: I am not a Chartered Accountant or a CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst) or an Accounts Graduate. I am an engineer by profession and these numbers stated are my understanding of "Publicly available" information. I donot claim them to be accurate .. Its my understanding of what I think it should be..

Anyone who can provide more insight .. please feel free to value add.. Those who are not invested should also invest as these are extremely low prices for Jayant Agro Organics (Below Rs100 per share)

Most Important... Please do your own deep dive before investing.. 





Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Safal Niveshak: Learning how to fish.

It has been quite some time since any new stock recommendation has been done on this blog..
Primarily its because I am turning bearish and diversification I feel is not going to give any better results.

Recently I came across a blog where you get to learn how to fish (invest) and its presented in "layman" terms.. The website is: http://www.safalniveshak.com

Safal Niveshak (Hindi phrase for ‘successful investor’) is a movement to help you, the small investor, become intelligent, independent, and successful in your stock market investing decisions. It’s about a new way of thinking about investing that can unleash the smart investor within you, and lead you to prosperity and financial peace of mind

Lots of stuff to read with tutorials video's, pdf company review's. Though I did not see any stock tips.. but then I feel its important to read these articles and this will give you the conviction to find value and have conviction on your find. 

--------------
If you are looking for stock picks.. you should try the screener.. http://www.screener.in/

you get highest dividend yield.. best quarterly results .. you also have options to develop your own custom screen.. I think its a great tool.. specially when its available for free.

So this is it.. A Screener to filter through the listed companies list (India it seems has the largest number of listed stocks and BSE is the largest in the world for number of listed securities.)
Screener has a companion site "http://dalal-street.in/" where stocks are recommended..

So we have a Screener to narrow down the list of stocks.. then we have fundamental analysis tutorial in "safal niveshak" so that you can catch your own fish!!


Happy Fishing and Happy Investing

Thursday, February 07, 2013

Jayant Agro: Dec 2012 Quarterly Result Review

Jayant Agro Dec 2012 Quarterly and 9 month results are out.
You can get a copy directly for the company website here (Link)

We generally look at the Consolidated data.


We compare the expenses, earnings all as a percentage of sales..
Important observations are:-
1 - There is a drop in sales.  323.58 Cr(Dec 2012) Vs 403.18Cr (Dec 2011) that's a steep fall of 19.74%
something to watch out for and a cause for concern.

2 - Operating margins (PBDIT) 6.16% (Dec2012) Vs 4.99%(Dec2011) margins have improved 1.17% which is great news and is expected because Jayant Agro has started commercial production of Sebacic Acid in its new plant which is high value castor oil derivative where margins should be better.

3 - Operating margins even at 9 months level 6.78%(Dec 2012) Vs 5.05%(Dec 2011) clearly shows that Jayant Agro is doing better and will report atleast 100bps improvement in operating margins at PBDIT level for the full year.

4 - Depreciation is 1.02%(Dec 2012) Vs 0.40% (Dec 2011) this is a pretty big jump actually.
Looking at the 9 months data we can see that 
Depreciation: 9.77Cr (Dec2012) Vs 4.53Cr(Dec 2011) that's a 115.67% increase.

Dig a little deeper and looking at the consolidated annual report March 2012 we see that:-
Tangible Assets on March 2011: 36.06Cr 
Tangible Assets on March 2012: 134.50Cr

There is a rise of 272.98% in Tangible Asset over last year. This is mainly driven (I assume by the starting of commercial production of the Sebacic Acid Plant and capitalization of the new plant)

Depreciation it seems is one of the primary reason for drop in reported profits.

5 - Interest Payments:- This is the real reason Jayant Agro gets poor valuation. 
Interest as a percentage of sales on 9 month basis:
27.32Cr (Dec 2012 - 2.38% ) Vs 27.45Cr (Dec 2011 - 2.00%)
Even though on an absolute basis the interest payments are down.. but since the topline has reduced by a larger percentage .. Interest payments have actually taken a larger share of income.


Conclusion: No denying the fact that topline has reduced which is a major cause for concern. Jayant's Derivative business has helped in improving margin during these tough times. The starting of commercial production has also increased the asset base from 36.06Cr to 134.50Cr which will increase the depreciation numbers going forward impacting the reported profits. Interest rates are still rising in Jayant Agro's books .. and is a cause for concern. This perpetual rise in interest payments has to be curtailed if Jayant Agro has to improve its valuations.

Jayant Agro is the largest player and is very well established in castor oil and castor oil derivatives business. If it was any other company in any other field of operations .. it would be a cause for concern. Considering that Jayant is uniquely placed to take advantage of castor oil production base of India ..and the "Green Chemical" being a sunshine industry.. I would still consider it a great buy ..at current price levels (106-110)  but with a longer time horizon of 2+ yrs for substantial return. Longer horizon due to the fact that Global economy is contracting and there could be some delay in ramp up of demand for Green Chemicals..

PN: These are my personal views and opinion based on publicly available information. I do have investments in stocks that are discussed or reviewed in this blog. Please do your own deep dive before investing.

Saturday, January 12, 2013

One Idiot: Saving and Investing Initiative by IDFC

I think this is a simple movie which will get new folks into investing... 
hope people will invest directly rather than go the mutual fund route where the charges eat into your earning potential.



Wednesday, January 02, 2013

Economic Times-500 List

Times of India Group. Economic Times Top 500 companies rank 2012
ET ranking is based on revenues (sales)

Home page of ET-500 (Link)
ET-500 Complete List (Link)

ET-500 home page Link will be included in the Interesting Stuff (Sidebar)